

SHIFTS OF FOOTING IN MRS HILLARY CLINTON'S ELECTORAL SPEECH

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In this paper, I discuss footing both in general and with reference to the analysis of paralinguistic clues in one of Hillary Clinton's electoral speeches. I try to show that footing is a construction that can be obtained through textual strategies, while shifts of footing are often signalled through facial expression. It is impossible to analyse the notion of footing without taking into account the oral dimension of communication. I also propose that one should look at the interplay of the argumentative structure and of shifts of footing.

1. Introduction

In this paper, I essentially follow a tradition of analysis originating in Goffman's *Forms of Talk* (1981) (in particular, in his essay on *Footing*) and I propose that the notions we use in everyday talk, such as speaker and hearer, are, in fact, gross categories obscuring more laminated structures of participation. While the categories 'speaker' and 'hearer' can be useful from the point of view of the turn-taking system (see Levinson 1988), the decomposition of these categories has some work to do in connection with the laminated structure of discourse and the kind of embeddings required by the need to decouple voices and social roles. In this paper, I essentially analyse and discuss fragments from an electoral speech by Hillary Clinton and I propose that she generally takes on a footing involving detachment, a rational attitude to discourse, a point of view implying identification with her political party (so she does not only speak for herself but for others she represents). This position about Clinton's general footing is reminiscent of considerations expressed by Goodwin (2007) in his critique of Goffman (1981) and by Levinson

(1988), as a speaker may not only speak for herself but also for others, including the people she represents and also an ideal rational speaker whom she can represent. Mrs Clinton's speech is something to be accomplished as part of a public performance, in which she speaks as someone who has to take on a certain role (she speaks for the Democratic Party and for herself; she is messenger in Levinsonian terms (or a representative), with the exception that her voice is also represented/included in her speech). However, there are moments when she shifts to a more personal footing, in which it is visible that she is able to speak from her very heart. This is done by telling a personal story whose purpose is, on the one hand, to present the self in a positive light (see Langellier (1989) on the 'self-aggrandizing' function) and, on the other hand, to lead to a moral evaluation (see Langellier 1989, Labov and Waletzky 1967, Norrick 2016). This part is characterized by formal markers (e.g. a movement of the hand as if to put off a fly), by many pauses, and by lengthening of certain words (a slowing down of the tempo) as if to express intense feeling through them. I discuss several fragments where this type of change of footing occurs and contrast them with excerpts where some other type of footing is expressed. The two types of footing are not merely in opposition, but one is embedded in the other. Mrs Clinton is like a narrator injecting the voices of the people whose lives are narrated into her story. The embedded narratives are crucially embedded in the main narrative. Analogously, following the Goffmanian analysis, Mrs Clinton is a main narrator, whose voice coincides with that of the representatives of her political party, but who, at times, is free to make her own voice audible in a distinctly personal way. Her own personal voice is embedded into an impersonal voice, that of the politician who rationally and coldly evaluates arguments and takes positions. This Goffmanian embedding creates an interesting interplay of different segments of speech at the level of rhetorical structure, as one segment is to be taken as giving support to another discourse segment.

In this discussion, I try to highlight the role played by oral clues, such as tone of voice, intensity of energy, pauses, and also gestures (Goffman

1981 includes facial expressions into gestures) which iconically correlate with some type of footing. As Clark (2016) says, “[...] in everyday discourse, people depict things with their hands, arms, face, eyes, voice and body, with and without props. Examples include iconic gestures, facial gestures, quotations of all kinds, full scale demonstrations, and make-believe play” (2016: 1). The novelty of this type of analysis is to discuss features of oral texts normally overlooked by discourse analysts and to connect the issue of footing with the issue of what rhetorical effects the speaker wants to achieve (so to say, the perlocutionary effects of the shifts of footing). While both Goffman (1981) and Levinson (1988) are persuaded they are expressed linguistically, in this paper I am calling attention to the possibility of combining linguistic and paralinguistic markers (e.g. facial expression or what Goffman (1981) and Levinson (1988) call ‘prosodic coloring’), arguing that hearers must be on the alert for capturing and decoding these markers on the basis of the principle that depictions are physical analogs of what they represent (Clark 2016: 8; see Peirce 1932). They are also markers which do not have a full linguistic status in that they are often, though not necessarily, associated with non-cancellable meanings. Indeed, they seem to be able to evaporate in some cases. The use of such markers seems to implicate rather than semantically express a footing or a change of footing. We are doing work on the processes involved in understanding footing, filling a lacuna acknowledged by Levinson (1988):

[...] we are not here primarily concerned with the *processes* through which particular participant roles are assigned or claimed, except in the most sketchy way. Rather, we are concerned with *what kinds* of categories we need to capture the assignment that we intuitively perform. There is little doubt that what is really interesting is precisely how such categories are invoked and manipulated, and what background expectations and linguistic and conversational devices play a role in these assignments. (Levinson 1988, 192).

2. *Analysis*

In this paper, I mainly discuss a speech delivered by Hillary Clinton in her 2016 electoral campaign¹ for the Presidency, capitalizing on Goffman's notion of footing. I consider language as essentially dialogic and utterances as segments to be analyzed in context² (Volosinov 1973) using all resources available, including the analysis of gestures, tone of voice and other contextual clues such as facial expression (see Goodwin 2007). There is a lot to be said about this text in terms of rhetorical structure, but I have decided to select a single focus of attention. The point of departure of this discussion is the oral text (see the link in the bibliography), although I admit reading the written text too, for convenience (see the link in the bibliography).

Needless to say, there is such a gap between the text as delivered before the real speech and the speech proper, rich with paralinguistic clues, that I discourage the readers of this paper from having a look at the written text. I should have furnished an annotated transcription myself, but the text is too long to be able to do this for the purpose of a paper. Thus, my analysis will be confined to fragments of the speech closely related to the discussion of footing, as too many data would certainly be a distraction. As a result of this narrower focus, I will be able to comment on rich contextual oral clues. In this analysis, I follow Goodwin's (2000: 1492) proposal that "a primordial site for the analysis of human language, cognition, and action consists of a situation in which multiple participants are attempting to carry out courses of action with each other through talk, while attending to both the larger activities that their current actions are embedded within, and relevant phenomena in their surround".

The main idea of footing (as canonically received) is that there is a principled way to distinguish between the notion/role of animator (the person voicing the speech/utterance), the role of author (the person or team who authored the text) and the notion of principal (the person (or persons) responsible for the utterance). Although this is only part of the idea of footing (the other part, probably underexplored, is

related to the notion of recipient, magisterially explored in Goffman 1981, Levinson 1988 and Bell 1984), this is already something to start with in connection with a text that is so specific (the electoral speech), because in this kind of speech a legitimate question arises: who wrote the speech? (How many and who were the authors?). In a political speech, we do not expect the speaker to be necessarily the author of the text delivered or the sole author, as we take the norm to be the case in which a politician is helped by a team (who correct, amend, ameliorate, suggest). There is a team of authors, whose aim is to deliver a product that is sufficiently clear, speaks to the heart and uses rhetorical devices in order to achieve persuasion. If we compare the speech by Mrs Clinton to any other text, a rhetorical quality reminiscent of Grice's maxim of manner emerges: (Perspicuity) be communicative/do not use expressions likely not to be understood or to be misunderstood (something that parallels Allan (1986) and Dascal's (2003) notion that a speaker has a duty to make himself understood). In a political speech, perspicuity is presumably achieved by a team of authors who are careful enough to substitute any word likely to be misunderstood by a large slice of the population, let alone the slice of immigrants (including Latinos, who are a large part of the democratic electorate). Mrs Clinton and her team choose a type of language and rhetoric that can be understood by anyone at all. In ordinary conversation there is usually a coincidence between the role of animator, author, principal, with the exception of certain chunks of discourse involving more laborious interpretation, such as ironic utterances, indirect reports, quotations (explicit or implicit), insertions of poetic texts, etc. The question of the coincidence of animator/author/principal is not one that should be addressed and resolved on every occasion, utterance by utterance, and I even proposed in Capone (2010) that coincidence of these three roles is normally due to a pragmatic inference (a default inference), to be explained in a number of ways. In certain specific speech events, like the conference or the electoral speech or the play, we need to know that there can be a shift of footing (we know well

(and in advance) that the political orator is not necessarily the author of the text). The issue of responsibility (who is the principal?) is even trickier, as was shown in my analysis of a speech by Barack Obama (Capone 2010). In that speech, the people whose stories are reported become 'sort of' authors/principals and their voices blend with that of the main speaker. It is difficult to disentangle those voices and the result is that there is not a single principal but several principals (for the same message). Barack Obama's main rhetorical expediency is to recruit other people's voices and to act as a representative – he is a sort of animator but (not surprisingly) the stories told converge towards his (own) message and the voices finally blend, while the audience has the impression that the orator has a right to be elected because he promises to do what he should literally do, that is to say, represent their voices. Now, one of the difficulties of my analysis (of the speech by Clinton) is segmentation in the light of the idea of footing. There are clearly parts in which the speaker dissociates from her utterance, projecting an interpretation similar to quotation (see Norrick 2016), but the main issue to investigate is what her main footing is during the delivery of her speech. Does she want, in general, to convey the impression that she really believes the things she says (coincidence of animator/author/principal) or not?

As Levinson (1988) says, in addition to saying that there are several footings or that shifts of footing occur, one also ought to provide a theory of how it comes about that a certain footing is projected and shifts of footing occur at some points. As Goffman (1981) says, one also needs a theory of how a lamination of the speech event (and of any speech act contained in it) is constructed and of how one manages to parenthesize certain fragments of the interaction. A theory of how multiple embeddings are achieved is needed. Goffman offers various examples of how parenthesizing can be achieved. One may, for example, repeat what someone else said in a tone of voice distinctly critical (or disparaging); in this way, by the particular tone of voice (or the marked tone of voice) one signals a change of footing, expressing the idea that

one is not speaking for oneself but one is *animating* a certain fragment of speech (the tone of voice adds additional baggage of criticism, that is to say negative attitude, thus the fragment is laminated further as the words are presented as coming from someone else, while the critical stance is presented as coming from oneself). Another example provided by Goffman in which the discourse is perceived to be laminated is direct or indirect quotation, in which the hearer is busy trying to understand which segments of the discourse belong to the speaker (reporter) or to the original speaker (see Holt 2016 and Norrick 2016 on this). Another example of lamination or embedding is that of a narration in which the main narrator speaks but also presents other characters as speaking, thus his main voice has to be separated from the voices of the speakers whose speech is narrated (also see Norrick 2016).

Let me now turn to the general problem of segmentation in terms of the notion of footing. If there are shifts in footing, (according to Goffman 1981) these ought to be marked linguistically (whether by an existing convention or some temporally available pragmatic means) or paralinguistically (the complementary channel, as Goffman called it).

Consider the following fragment:

Now, there may be some new voices in the presidential Republican choir,
but they're all singing the same old song...
A song called "Yesterday."
You know the one — all our troubles look as though they're here to stay...
and we need a place to hide away... They **believe** in yesterday.
And you're lucky I didn't try singing that, too, I'll tell you!

Although this is not an annotated transcription, I will contextualize it soon and fill it with paralinguistic clues. This is a really interesting fragment because it does not fit existing standards of description. It is not quotation. It is not an indirect report. (one may call it quasi-quotation, following a suggestion by S. Levinson, p.c.). It looks like a summary cum criticism (see Holt 2016, Norrick 2016 and Capone (forthcoming) on indirect reports as summaries). Clearly, Clinton is

not quoting verbatim, but is summarizing what her political opponents say through a quoted text (a famous song by The Beatles). The quoted text, however, is not representing the words spoken by her political opponents but their content. This is a very interesting expedient, since quoted texts usually represent the words by those who uttered them, but in this case the (*prima facie*) quoted text is going to represent the content of the words of those who uttered the message (whatever it is) through words used by singers who were different from them (see Norrick 2016 on the idea that direct quotations are most of the times used in a non-direct way). There is a double dissociation, in other words. Now, clearly Mrs Clinton is dissociating herself both from the words (as they are not hers) and from the content (which belongs to the opposition party).

Following Clark (2016), we can interpret this admittedly unique case by the following procedure:

- a. Establish a mapping (of function) between what is said and what is intended;
- b. Use an analogy between the words actually used and the concept expressed;
- c. The concepts expressed by the song evoked ought to parallel the message expressed by Republican candidates;
- d. In the same way in which the song evoked is old, the message by the Republican candidates is old (it is the same old story);
- e. A description fits well the song evoked: an old song. By analogy, the same description and its metaphorical meaning applies to the message by Republican candidates inferred through analogy: it is an old song. This metaphor is clearly pejorative.

- f. The application of the metaphorical description triggers a conversational implicature: it is an old song, therefore we should reject it.
- g. This conversational implicature interacts with the utterance by Clinton: ‘and you’re lucky I didn’t try singing that too’ and produces a further conversational implicature: I am saying something new, I am the future, while the Republican candidates are the past.




Figure 1: Hillary Clinton

Another characteristic of this reported message is that it was condensed, summarized and also transformed into an evaluation (these programs mean trouble). We do not know what the message reported is except in so far as we know what its consequences are (or are deemed to be). Thus the summary of the content is heavily elaborated on. The quotation ends with a case of mixed quotation, which I will represent as follows for the readers’ convenience: They “believe in yesterday”.

Here there is clearly an interpolation because ‘I’ was replaced by ‘They’ in Mrs Clinton’s speech. Another interpolation consists in changing

the stress from 'I' (as is in the Beatles' song) to 'believe'. Mrs Clinton achieves stress by slowing her speech, increasing the acoustic energy and, also, by a paralinguistic clue, such as raising and then lowering her finger in front of her eyes. It is of considerable interest that this fragment of quotation is bracketed by prominent paralinguistic clues, which I will call 'glowing'. Basically, she smiles intensely.

The first smiling or glowing expression is one of scorn – the position expressed by her opponents through her synthesis is risible – something one can laugh at (notice that her glowing expression obtains the effect of creating hilarity in the audience, through an effect that can be called 'resonance'). Here we are clearly faced with a certain degree of iconicity – but this is hardly surprising as iconicity is one of the features of representative/semiotic systems (the maxim of manner with its insistence on ordering events to some extent borrows from iconicity principles; see also Labov and Waletzky (1967) for the same principles as applied to the structure of stories). It has to be noted that when the evaluative component of her quotation/indirect report/summary-with-critique is about to be concluded, her expression becomes quite serious with an element of frowning (see Goffman on this). Her face becomes glowing again when she says 'And you're lucky I didn't try singing that too', with the implication that hearers have a reason to rejoice – the happiness of the face is an anticipatory reaction to the happiness of the hearers. Her tone of voice, during the quotation/indirect report/summary-with-critique becomes theatrical, her cadence slower, clearly reflecting a deliberate attempt to segment her speech and her (shifts of) footing.

This analysis of a fragment only shows that footing offers an interesting theoretical tool. However, there will be more difficult points in this paper. Before proceeding with the tough part, let me pause to give an analysis of the conclusion of Mrs. Clinton's speech.

I wish my mother could have been with us longer.

I wish she could have seen Chelsea become a mother herself.

I wish she could have met Charlotte.
I wish she could have seen the America we're going to build together.
An America, where if you do your part, you reap the rewards.
Where we don't leave anyone out, or anyone behind.
An America where a father can tell his daughter: yes, you can be
anything you want to be. Even President of the United States.
Thank you all. God bless you. And may God bless America.

This is somewhat reminiscent of Martin Luther King's 'I have a dream' speech (also see Capone (2010) for such echoes in Barack Obama's speeches). The speaker is representing herself as being *utopian*, somehow in the footsteps of her predecessor Barack Obama, incarnating an America capable of having idealistic dreams. Such dreams include social justice (an America, where if you do your part, you will reap the rewards). But her most important dream is expressed last (an America where a father can tell his daughter, yes, you can be anything you want to be. Even President of the United States). It is of some interest that her dreams are associated both with a mother and a father figure. But she shifts from the kind of things which her mother could have dreamt of to the kind of things that a father (any father, therefore even her father) could dream of. But, obviously, no father would dream his daughter could become President; it would be justified to dream that only if his daughter was worth it.³ There is an implicit element (an explicature to use terminology by pragmatics like Carston (2002)) in what is said, but this element is reinforced by a premise, which renders this explicature plausible: An America, where, if you do your part, you reap the rewards. Mrs Clinton seems to structure her speech in such a rhetorical way that the final dream can appear to be a logical consequence of a previous dream. Given that in America, when you do your part, you will reap your rewards, you are entitled to dream of (and your father would be entitled to dream this too) becoming President of the USA. There is clearly much heavier inferencing than this. As now (although she is not saying it) Mrs Clinton is suggesting (in an implicit way, but in a way that is not easily cancellable or retractable) that she

dreams of becoming President because she is entitled to do this, given that in a fair America she too would reap the rewards having done her part (and her speech makes it abundantly clear that she has done her part, by serving her country loyally as secretary of state, and by championing many important causes). There is another implicit message. People should vote for her because she deserves it, because if she was not voted, voters would infringe one of the tacit principles of the American creed (you should reap your rewards if you have done your duty). It is interesting to say that in the final segment of the final part of her speech she assumes a facial expression which has something to do with footing. Again her facial expression becomes glowing, as if to say: this is something to rejoice about, something that, if and when it happens, will prove that Americans are this way. So there are two causes of happiness: a) the fact that a principle is shown to work, attesting that society is honest and not rotten; b) there are good consequences flowing from this principle.

Why is it that I take the glowing expression as a marker of footing, in this case? First of all, it accompanies the explicatures and implicatures and it seems to confirm them. Thus, the speaker proposes to be principal with respect to implicatures and explicatures too (this is hardly surprising, though).⁴ Second, this is a part of her speech in which she appears to be really 'herself'. She is speaking for herself. This is something that makes her particularly happy – there is something personal about this issue (she is a woman and she wants to see a society where women, too, count and have the chance of becoming President of USA). She does not only want to champion this cause because it is the right cause, but because it is a cause concerning her as a woman and as an individual, because an individual who can experience that society is fair to 'her' has real causes to rejoice about. So, the smiling glow, being connected with expressive meaning, becomes associated with this aspect of the footing 'speaking from the heart'.

Now, we have identified a type of footing which can be defined or termed 'speaking from the heart' and this can be contrasted with ano-

ther type of footing which can be termed ‘speaking from the brain’. A person may say things not because she feels them, because they are the things she believes, but because they are the things which she ought to believe or she ought to say. (She believes they are the truth, but only due to rational scrutiny not to personal experience). Now as Levinson (1988) says, this, too, is an essential part of footing, as he embraces the marriage between footing and modality (see Capone 2001) and thus, by implication, he has to accept that in certain segments of the discourse one speaks not as one feels but as one ought to speak. There are things we say, in other words, because we can infer them, because we use logical powers of deduction (things which anyone with rational powers can deduce). We should clearly find ways to mark such segments of discourse as involving this *inferential footing* (Levinson 1988 clearly points to cases in which one speaks through inference not on the basis of experiential knowledge, as when one says in Italian ‘Saranno le nove’ (It will be nine), which means that the speaker has not based his assertion on his experience of his watch but, on the contrary, on rational justification, inferencing, etc.). The overall impression we get, from Clinton’s tone of voice, is that she uses tone to contrast the things she believes with the things others say or the things which she ought to say (in that she is a rational agent, she is capable of logical deductions and logical acumen). The analysis of the quotation/indirect report/summary-with-critique confirms that she can use tone of voice to differentiate footing. Something which others say but Clinton does not believe suddenly acquires a theatrical cadence, as if she merely performed a play (her speech becomes slower, etc.). In this speech there are mainly three types of footing: a) she is performing a speech event of the type ‘electoral speech’ in which it is important to show to others that one can reason well, speak for the party she represents, and offer solutions to problems that reflect a rational mind (performing includes not believing that one will be able to deliver all promises but one makes them because it is rational to make them and because, by making them, one gives the impression that one is rational); b) bracketing a segment of speech as coming from

another source (whether an opponent or a supporter); c) showing that one is particularly sincere in certain fragment of one's speech, as this addresses issues which are of importance to oneself.

Consider the initial fragment which is in a mirror relationship with respect to the conclusion (a symmetry which one cannot fail to notice, and which can be recruited for the purpose of logical deduction: given that we are in a place with absolutely no ceilings (symbolic meaning: upward limits to what can happen) one can also expect it to happen that a woman will be elected President of USA):

Thank you! Oh, thank you all! Thank you so very, very much.
It is wonderful to be here with all of you.
To be in New York with my family, with so many friends,
including many New Yorkers who gave me the honour of serving
them in the Senate for eight years.
To be right across the water from the headquarters of the
United Nations, where I represented our country many times.
To be here in this beautiful park dedicated to Franklin Roosevelt's
enduring vision of America, the nation we want to be.
And in a place... with absolutely no ceilings.

The glowing facial expression appears twice, in the greetings section and then in the utterance

And in a place... with absolutely no ceilings.

Understandably, the speaker wants to show gratitude to the audience for being there – but it is also an acknowledgment of the presence of the recipients (see what happens in face to face interaction, when we shake hands – at this point too we exchange glowing facial expressions). But her utterance “And in a place...with absolutely no ceilings” clearly contains a shift in footing, as she does not intend to be taken (only) literally but she also intends to be taken metaphorically (symbolically would be a more appropriate term). She supports her symbolical meaning by a glowing smile reinforcing the shift in footing which means

‘This is something to rejoice about’. In a sense, we do not understand the full (and deep) significance of this utterance (but we are aware of its symbolical implications from the outset) until we come to the end of her speech. Beginning and ending are in a symmetrical relationship and symmetry means that we should look at each as reinforcing each other. The beginning can be a premise of a tacit argument:

- There is no limit to what can happen.
- If there was a limit to what can happen, then a woman would never be elected.
- Suppose it is false that a woman would never be elected, then it would be false that there is a limit to what can happen.
- Since Clinton believes that there is no limit to what can happen, she is inviting her audience to make it false that a woman would never be elected.

This is a further premise for another implicit argument:

- It is false that a woman would never be elected.
- If you do your part you will reap your rewards.
- I have done my part.
- I am worthy of becoming president.
- I am a woman.
- I can become President.
- If you decide to vote me, as I deserve, I will become president.

- I will become president
(if you decide to vote me, as I deserve).

Consider another fragment, where we easily see a change of footing (she shifts from an indirect report in which she expresses the voice of the Republicans, albeit indirectly, to a comment on that position).

Instead of an economy built by every American, for every American, we were told that if we let those at the top pay lower taxes and bend the rules, their success would trickle down to everyone else.

What happened?

Well, instead of a balanced budget with surpluses that could have eventually paid off our national debt, the Republicans twice cut taxes for the wealthiest, borrowed money from other countries to pay for two wars, and family incomes dropped.

You know where we ended up.

There is a fragment that constitutes an indirect report:

We were told that if we let those at the top pay lower taxes and bend the rules, their success would trickle down to everyone else.

However, it is a heavily contextualized indirect report as it is contrasted with an action which appears as a reasonable course of action (“instead of...”) and it is followed by a rhetorical question “What happened?”, followed only by a short summary and then by an evaluative “You know where we ended up”. This is a compressed reminder (see Stati 1983) – a reminder obliging the hearers to revisit their memories and see that the philosophy and actions of the Republicans caused negative consequences. It is a heavily charged presuppositional speech, where the presuppositions have some work to do, as they can be seen as a criticism of the opponent’s (expressed) philosophy (they could even be called ‘evaluative presuppositions’, as they are invoked to criticize a state of the world – one of the assumptions of classical rhetoric is that

what is presupposed or implied is more eloquent than what is expressed directly. The tacit evaluation is “This was no good”. Now it is interesting that this highly contextualized indirect report is contrasted by what ought to have been done and by the negative evaluations of the consequences of the philosophy indirectly reported (the Republican’s voice). But the report is accompanied by gesture and a special tone of voice. The utterance “would trickle down to everyone else” is accompanied by a movement of the left hand which is raised above the level of her head and then in repetitive movements of her fingers goes down to the level of the shoulder. The movement of her fingers resembles that of the fingers of a magician who is casting a spell or (alternatively) a finger which aims to grasp some money. (The latitude of interpretation does not do any harm, as anyway she is depicting her opponents as people who either say something which they do not believe or alternatively something whose ultimate aim is to procure money). At the same time, she accompanies her utterance with several movements of her head mirroring those of the hand (she looks like a magician casting a spell, actually). Now it is clear that her mimicking adds an evaluative component to the indirect report. She does not only report the content of what her opponents said, but also makes a comment on the intention behind the words⁵ (so, this is different either from quotation or from indirect reporting). She implicates that the Republicans said things which they did not believe to start with. (She represents their footing in saying the things they said).

Another fragment where the issue of footing can be addressed is the following:

You worked extra shifts, took second jobs, postponed home repairs...
 you figured out how to make it work. And now people are beginning
 to think about their future again – going to college, starting a business,
 buying a house, finally being able to put away something for retirement.

This looks like a narration, except that Clinton is identifying with the hearers (she is clearly addressing the poorest layers of society or the middle classes which she repeatedly describes as having been disempowered). The sacrifices described are clearly heavy and to stress that, as well as that she is capable of sympathizing (ultimately identifying) with her hearers, she pronounces verbs with extra acoustic energy as if to emphasize the idea of the sacrifices involved (iconically, the heaviness of her words mirrors the heaviness of the sacrifices). However, when she expresses legitimate dreams and ideals, her tone of voice becomes softer, her speech becomes softer and slower. She shows that she is able to identify with the dreams and hopes of her audience. Here we clearly see a shift from the detached and impersonal voice of the politician to a voice expressing identification between the politician and the people. This is a shift of footing, as now she is giving voice to the people, she is animating their voices too.

Matters of footing can be discussed also with reference to the next fragment:

They shame and blame women, rather than respect our right
to make our own reproductive health decisions.
They want to put immigrants, who work hard and pay taxes,
at risk of deportation.
And they turn their backs on gay people who love each other.
Fundamentally, they reject what it takes to build an inclusive economy.
It takes an inclusive society. What I once called “a village”
that has a place for everyone.

Now, my values and a lifetime of experiences have given me
a different vision for America.

The fragment starts with indirect reports (admittedly implicit indirect reports; the verb ‘say’ is missing but the indirect report is reconstructed because all the actions logically require some saying on the part of the Republicans). The speaker is contrasting the Republican voice (and

creed) with her own. At this point, Clinton becomes one who speaks from her heart (although she does not stop being a representative of the Democratic Party).



Figure 2: Hillary Clinton

It is of some interest that in speaking for herself, in signalling her shift of footing from one who merely speaks as a political speaker or representative of a big party to someone who mainly speaks for herself she quotes her own speech (“What I once called ‘a village’”). Thus, there is a metalinguistic awareness of what is happening as the change of footing is accompanied by an explicit description of the kind of technique she is using. But then she uses a gesture, as she puts her hand on her heart, a gesture with iconic significance (she means that her words come from her heart, not only from her mind). This gesture too signals a change in footing. She has now abandoned the projected image of herself as a politician who has to say the things she says, even though presenting them in the most rational way. She now feels the things she says. This is a genuine side of herself. Paralinguistic clues also militate in favour of this interpretative possibility, as she makes longer pauses between chunks of speech, rendering the concepts she expresses more emphatic.

I will now discuss a final fragment to show that Mrs Clinton uses a special type of footing: speaking from her heart. At this point she talks about personal experience and although this experience leads to a further premise to integrate into the pattern of her overall argument, she is cunning enough to let her audience think and believe, for the course of her narration, that this episode is insulated from her principal argumentative structure (I will call this technique 'apparent insulation'). For a fragment of the conversation, the hearers do not know where they are being landed and forget about this, although immediately after the narration Mrs Clinton turns her personal experience into a premise to the conclusion of an argument ("That's why I believe with all my heart in America and in the potential of every American. To meet every challenge").

I didn't learn this from politics (pause 16.46-16.47: 1 sec) (she moves her hand as if to throw something away) I learned this from my own family (pause 16.50-16.51: 1 sec) My mother (pause 16.51-16.52: 1 sec) taught me that everybody needs a chance (10.54-10.55: 1 sec) and a champion. (Pause 16.56-16.57: 1 sec) She knew what it was like not to have either one. (Pause 16.01-16.02: 1 sec) Her own parents abandoned her, and by 14 she was out on her own, working as a housemaid. Years later, when I was old enough to understand, I asked what kept her going. You know what her answer was? Something very simple: Kindness (pause 1 sec) from someone who **believed** (pause 1 sec) she **mattered**. (bold: lengthening the duration of the syllable) The 1st grade teacher who saw she had nothing to eat at lunch (pause 1 sec) and, without embarrassing her, (pause 1 sec) brought extra food to share. (17.36-17.37: 1 sec) The woman whose house she cleaned letting her go to high school so long as her work got done. (17.43-17.44: 1 sec) That was a bargain she leapt to accept. (17.47-17.48: 1 sec) And, **because some** people believed in **her**, (pause 17.51-17.52: 1 sec) she believed in **me**. (bold: lengthening) (pause 17.54-17.55: 1 sec) That's why (pause 17.56-18.02: 6 sec) I believe with all my heart (pause 18.04-18.05: 1 sec) in America (pause 0,5 sec) and in the potential (pause 0,5) of every American.(pause 18.09-18.10: 1 sec) To meet every challenge. (0,5)

To be resilient...no matter what the world throws at you.

(pause 18.15-18.16)

To solve the toughest problems.

I believe we can do all these things because I've seen it happen.

This narration (the narration immediately prior to “That’s why...”) adopts the footing of someone who speaks from her very heart (as stressed later on in the text itself by Mrs Clinton), someone who speaks from personal experience, rather than from deduction or reasoning. If you go to the oral text, you will see how careful she is to bracket her shift of footing (“I did not learn this from politics (pause 16.46-16.47: 1 sec)...I learned it from my own family”) and to intersperse pauses, which give the impression that her memories produce some kind of sorrow in her. The way she unequivocally brackets this shift of footing is by a gesture of her hand (something similar to what we do to put off a fly, something that annoys us), which presumably indicates that she believes her shift of footing is more valuable and people should appreciate it because she leaves the position of the public speaker and she assumes the position of someone who can afford to speak maximally sincerely.

3. Discussion

I have asked myself whether the general footing adopted during the electoral speech definable as ‘Delivering a public speech in which one evaluates arguments and speaks from the point of view of the party represented’ (with the exception of the parts where I emphasized that there is a different footing) is something which is signalled or marked chunk by chunk or whether it is the semiotic situation (or the language game of the political electoral speech, to use terminology by Wittgenstein) which, generally speaking, expresses this point of view. There are certainly elements of convention playing a role. In an electoral speech one speaks from the point of view of the represented party, one normally reports the successes achieved and one makes a certain number

of electoral promises (which one does not really believe one can fulfil). Promises have a conditional character (the conditional being provided by a tacit segment through pragmatics (possibly an explicature)), as the speaker promises to do something if she is elected and if she is allowed to do it (by Congress or by the political or financial situation).⁶ Thus, in particular, promises are not things the speaker believes she will necessarily fulfil; nor does the audience pretend to believe that the speaker will fulfil them, as they are well aware of the conditional character of the promises. Promises are simply there to show how the speaker intends to cope with a certain situation by using maximally rational resources. All that promises can do is attest to the rationality of the speaker, his or her character, her inclinations, but they are portions of speech in which the speaker presents herself as someone who performs a speech, someone who believes that these are things that ought to be done, but not necessarily things which will be done. It is not necessarily the footing of the animator, who merely voices the words of another person. Here the speaker is or can be an author of the text voiced and the voice represented is at least the voice of his own party, not any voice at random. But the speaker is not pretending that she is speaking from the heart. (Thus it could be problematic to indirectly report a speaker like Clinton by using the quasi performative 'she promised to', as this would need further qualification; thus Allan (2016) and Capone (2010) are quite right in saying that indirectly reporting a speech act involves reconstructing implicit elements present in the speech situation/context). As I said there are elements of convention about this – we know more or less how we would recite in a theatrical performance and we use that tone of voice. The tone of voice associated with performances is recognizably conventional. Thus, we should not be surprised if in most of her speech, Mrs Clinton assumes this type of tone of voice, detached, rational, impersonal, representative of a type (her party). This kind of footing, however, is not only the result of convention and also of using a tone of voice which reminds us of actors – of people who have to recite things according to a script

– but it is also the result of a rhetorical and textual strategy adopted by Mrs Clinton who presents herself as someone who was elected by New Yorkers, as someone who has represented her country numerous times as secretary of state, as someone who interprets the voice of all Americans (the use of the inclusive ‘we’ in “the nation we want to be” is a sort of political *pluralis maiestatis*) but who also animates at the beginning of her speech the words and creeds of President Roosevelt (“guided by the fundamental American belief that real, lasting prosperity must be built by all and shared by all”). When in a sudden, but expected shift of footing that lends her all the authority of the voices she is quoting, Hillary Clinton’s voice blends with the quoted voices (Roosevelt, Obama, Bill Clinton) (“That still sounds good to me”), it is now explicit what footing she will officially adopt.⁷ She is going to speak as one with Obama, Clinton, Roosevelt and Democrats (Clinton and Obama are explicitly represented as “two Democrats” she served and she is serving). This footing is being constructed by rhetorical and textual strategies and is the result of what she explicitly says combined with implicit elements (the vague suggestion that she is performing in a certain role and the force of conventions of electoral speeches). Through her speech, except for some moving segments, she will speak in this footing. However, when she departs from this general tone of voice and this general footing, she has to indicate what kind of footing she adopts – and now the onus of choosing abundant clues that can help her audience recognize her temporary footing falls on her, and she can resort to iconic language (gestures), facial expression (glowing), softening of her voice, lengthening, pauses, etc. to express the role of someone who speaks from the heart. This can be considered a case of what Goffman (1981) and Levinson (1988) call ‘prosodic colouring’, the use of prosodic effects to indicate the kind of footing adopted. It is not completely clear that this is a linguistic marker to be intended as a conventional indicator, or, rather, as a marker that triggers, instead, a conversational implicature due to the maxim of manner (the use of a marked expression conveys an implicature; see Huang 1994). What-

ever the full story (and there certainly is an interesting story to tell about this phenomenon and its pragmatic (or semiotic) mechanisms), prosodic colouring can be taken as a clue leading us towards a certain interpretation (while another is excluded) and this has to do with footing.

The structure of her speech event clearly shows segmentation and such segmentation is achieved thanks to general conventions for the use of language; but also thanks to numerous linguistic and paralinguistic clues recruited for the purpose of telling the audience where they are being landed. Her shifts of footing work as signposts showing the audience what to expect next and how to segment the structure of the discourse. Such markers are ways of providing a map of the territory that must be travelled across.

4. Conclusion

We have abandoned a type of conversation analysis where we concentrate on turns, to look at rhetorical structure and its relation to Goffman's notion of footing. In general, the relationship consists in highlighting the function of a certain chunk of speech in terms of rhetorical structure. Mrs Clinton is capable of segmenting speech which belongs to her opponent and to present it as something to laugh at. Instead, she presents her own speech, expressed through a personal footing, as something that is worth considering in rational decisions about who is right or wrong, who should win the elections or not. The interest of this paper lies in its focus on contextual clues and on their importance for the understanding of the general message projected by the politician.

One of the novelties of this paper is to introduce an analysis of participation framework in which the speaker is further decomposed and some categories are added to the ones discussed by Goffman (1981) and Levinson (1988). While Levinson believes that one should also express the idea that someone can speak on behalf of another person and such a notion defines a speaker that presupposes a source, who is not

actually doing the transmitting while the speaker does, Mrs Clinton's speech seems to presuppose further articulation of the participation framework as we need a speaker who speaks both for herself and her political party and for an ideal person to be called 'rational assessor' while at other times the speaker only speaks for herself intended *qua* person who conveys personal experiences and assessments. In this paper, I try to make a connection between footing, modality and rhetorical structure. Levinson (1988) was the first follower of Goffman to point out the connection between footing and modality, as a shift of footing is necessarily involved in statements which are 'hearsay'. The fact that a speaker becomes (only) animator has important consequences for the modal effects, as the proposition will not be heard as asserted and responsibility for it is assigned to someone else, the principal. These modal effects (see Capone 2001) can be linked with rhetorical structure, because if in a certain speech there are segments that are marked as coming from the heart and contrasted with segments in which one is speaking from the brain (or through deduction) or is a mere representative of a political party, clearly the segments in which the speaker speaks from the heart are taken to be persuasive to a greater effect (and in a different sort of way) and they may well be used to support positions expressed in the segments where the speaker is not speaking from the heart. The issue of footing, therefore, interacts with rhetorical structure and creates special effects establishing dependencies between official positions and more private positions related to personal events.

Another novelty of this paper is to have focused on features that are typical of oral communication. If one compares the oral text with the written script published on the internet, one clearly sees that the real essence of the speech is missing in the written script, which is unable to project all the meanings Mrs Clinton could convey thanks to the modulation of her voice, her gestures, facial expressions, pauses, etc. It is like comparing black and white tv with the colour screen. It is like comparing two types of geographical maps, one which contains little detail about the territory and one containing fine-grained details

about streets, railways, etc. A discourse rich with clues tells you what you are about to expect next and never gives you the impression that you are (easily) lost.

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Notes

¹Hillary Clinton's Presidential Campaign Announcement.

²What Augustine calls the 'circumstantiae' (Allan Forthcoming).

³Explicatures are inferences which very often render a certain statement (or discourse) plausible, by transforming a blatant falsehood into a truth or a contradictory statement into a contradictory one or an absurd statement into a plausible one (see Capone 2006, 2009). In this case, an element of rationality serves to modify Mrs Clinton's discourse as she is certainly not meaning that any father at all is entitled to dream that his daughter will become President of USA but only that this will take place if his daughter has done something to deserve that.

⁴The issue of footing, in connection with pragmatic inferences, was broached by Stalnaker (1973) in his classical paper on presupposition, although he was not conscious (or explicitly conscious) of being confronted with a Goffmanian notion), when he spoke of the propositional attitude of 'pretending that' as normally associated with some presuppositions.

⁵Remember that many things are included in Goffman's term footing. One of his examples of footing involves a lecturer who comments on his own text, that is to say opening a parenthesis. In this case, Clinton is not commenting on her own text but on her opponents' text.

⁶A referee commented that the conditional character of conditional promises is not really relevant to the main issue of this paper (footing). On the contrary, I believe it is very relevant, as in this speech (as in any other speech) there are shifts of footing and there are segments of discourse where the speaker is successful in projecting herself as one who fully believes the things she says (he or she is principal in Goffman's sense); there are, instead, other segments of discourse where the speaker says certain things because she has a duty to say them (being representative of a party for example). In this speech too we have several shifts of footing and there are parts in which the speaker is not really identifying with the things she says. Electoral promises are things which one says with many implicit reservations (I will do this, if I can). Thus one need not be completely responsible for such promises. They are contextually

weakened. I assume this is of relevance for pragmatic analysis. Also see Levinson (1988) on the connection between footing and modality.

⁷Holt (2016) in a most interesting paper shows an interest in segmenting direct reported speech and indirect reported speech on the basis of the presence of markers of direct reported speech such as turn initials, shifts in intonation, etc. which clearly attest to a change in footing. “That still sounds good to me” is an utterance which effects a change in footing because it retrospectively assigns another utterance to a different speaker (Roosevelt) by the very fact that it is an assessment of that utterance. One cannot assess an utterance without necessarily implying a shift of footing, as the assessment must obviously come from someone different from the person who proffered the utterance.

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