INDIAN NATIONALISM AND RESPONSE IN THE AFTERMATH OF ITS DEFEAT IN THE 1962 INDO-CHINA WAR
In the 1950s, India followed an idealistic, and not pragmatic, policy towards China based on illusions, unrealistic hopes and false assumptions, wherein it responded feebly to the Chinese occupation of Tibet and the construction of a road in Aksai Chin, joining Tibet with Sinkiang. The situation deteriorated further by the commencement of the Khampa Rebellion and the fleeing of the Dalai Lama from Tibet to India. This, coupled with the clashes on the border, led to the worsening of relations between India and China. India adopted an inherently flawed “Forward Policy” of establishing forward check posts all along the Indo-China border without any commensurate improvement in border infrastructure or military capability.
India was taken by complete surprise politically, diplomatically and militarily and caught totally unprepared when China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army attacked Indian Army positions in Ladakh sector on 20 October 1962. The war, which started with baffling suddenness and lasted for about a month, ended with equal swiftness on 21 November 1962, when China declared a unilateral ceasefire. The Indian Army suffered 9743 casualties, including 1423 killed, 3078 wounded,1655 missing believed killed and 3587 prisoners of war. Additionally, India lost 43000 square kilometres of territory to China. The country suffered its worst ever military defeat, which was also perceived by the public as a political and military debacle.
The notable feature of this historical event was that in the face of a massive Chinese invasion, India with its people from various cultures, races and religions united as never before and stood behind its Prime Minister to face the challenge. A surge of nationalism was witnessed all across India, with thousands of people volunteering to join the Indian armed forces. Hundreds of women gave away their jewellery to contribute to the funds for the defence of the nation. In the immediate aftermath of the war, Henderson Brooks Committee was constituted to investigate the reasons that led to the Indian defeat and recommend measures to restructure the defence apparatus. The Committee in its findings recommended numerous steps to be taken at the political, bureaucratic and military levels towards restructuring of the defence policy and the military preparedness against China.
The war also left a profound impact on the Indian Prime Minister, Jawahar Lal Nehru and severely dented his stature as a world leader. The deeply flawed Indian foreign policy with regard to China based on the premise of brotherhood, owing to the ancient cultural links between the nations, failed to correctly appreciate the requirements of defence and this proved very costly for the country. Some historians have opined that the realisation by Nehru of his own miscalculation and poor judgement left a deep mark on his health, from which he could never recover. He died on 27 May 1964, a disheartened and fatigued man.
The reverses of the 1962 war opened the eyes of the nation and its hierarchy to the requirements of defence. The Indian public and its leaders realised that pacts did not guarantee peace with greedy neighbours. Indian government resolved to take concrete steps to strengthen its armed forces. The strength of the Indian Army was doubled in the next two years and issues pertaining to its training and logistics were addressed in a quick time frame. India also revised its nuclear policy and developed nuclear capability in the next decade. It was due to the strengthening of its overall defence capability that India gave a befitting reply to Pakistan during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, which was initiated by Pakistan in the hope of victory and annexation of Kashmir.
The case study will pay special attention to how the 1962 Indo-China War impacted the spirit of nationalism, national identity and historical narratives in the subsequent years. Emphasis will also be laid on describing in detail, the national sentiment for various changes in the foreign and defence policies of the country. An endeavour will also be made to bring out the similarities and the dissimilarities between the responses by the vanquished nation in the Indo-China War of 1962 as compared with the responses in the Korean War of 1950-1953 and the US Vietnam War of 1955-1975.