Serhiy Choliy, PhD
Associate Professor for History, the Faculty of Sociology and Law, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (Ukraine)
E-mail: scholij@ukr.net
Paper abstract
This paper critically discusses the idea of a direct correlation between military defeat and stimulation of nation-building within the European context in the example of Ukraine. Contrary to the majority of examples of military defeats that form a basis for the national myths and paradigms (as it was also in Ukraine during both World Wars), the contemporary case of Ukraine demonstrates multiple dichotomies of this correlation.
On the one hand, Ukraine is de facto in a state of war with the Russian Federation starting from February 2014. After the period of major hostilities in 2014, the frontline came to a stalemate by February 2015. The frozen conflict in Ukraine was a major defeat for Kyiv, with three regions fully or partially occupied by Russia or Russia-controlled separatists. By the classical model, military defeat was used for the development of the Ukrainian state propaganda agenda, reflected in media and mass culture. National and military mobilizations, the major component of war-thorn life and foreign military pressure, should have been the obvious components of the everyday life of Ukraine after 2014.
Surprisingly, the reality of 2015-2022 was different. It was contrary to the state-led agenda of further national mobilization and adopting additional measures to return the occupied territories. As a diplomatic solution in Ukraine’s favor wasn’t possible only military action seemed to be a possibility to return the territorial integrity of the state. On the contrary, the majority of Ukraine’s population wasn’t ready for personal sacrifice, major economic loss, or long-time conflict. The slogan ‘to stop the war’ was one of the main reasons for the victory of the Zelensky administration in both elections of 2019. The majority of the population of Ukraine resisted compulsory mobilization to the army in 2014-2015, the same as it resisted regular military draft during 1991-2021. Draft dogging became one of the elements of liberalization in the Late Soviet Union and continued to evolve during the period of Ukrainian independence. General disarmament, the reduction of the quantity of every year draft, and corruption were the factors that turned the evasion of military duty into a regular and widespread social practice. Notwithstanding that, the same high level of political capital that the idea to abolish the draft brought to its initiators, mandatory military service is still in use in Ukraine. After the military defeat of 2014 and the loss of large territories in the East and South, the majority of the population of Ukraine still lived within the ‘welfare’ concept, devoting themselves to the Western values of mass consumption and self-realization. Nationalism, militarism, and patriotism might be nice slogans in Ukraine now, but not the reality of 2014-2022.
This thesis is reinforced by the analysis of several indicators of political and social activity during 2016-2021. It was made as a component of social surveys among the Ukrainian youth, conducted during 2017-2020 as a component of the scientific project “The improvement of the methods of human capital development as a component of the formation of the mobilization potential of Ukraine” (#2043, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute). Its main outcome is that the majority of Ukrainian student youth, questioned after the 2014-2015 escalation, confirmed their major interest in personal development, but not possible future war. This indicator correlates with the idea of general discontent with military service and its compulsory obligation notwithstanding the state-led nationalism and propaganda. Many examples of mobilization evasion and cases of attempted flight to the EU after February 2022 reinforce this thesis.
In the final part of my speech, I discuss the perspectives on the development of contemporary militarism/patriotism including the outcomes of the active phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022. The dichotomy is rather strong and seems to be unsolvable. The global tendency to abolish compulsory military service is an overwhelming tendency that is an integral component of the common lifestyle worldwide. On the other hand, the realities of the geopolitical situation, and the case study of Ukraine reinforce the concept of compulsory military service. As the sources of possible global or regional instability (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea etc.) most definitely use their available population resources en masse, countries at risk have no choice but to reconsider their agendas of usage of the available population. There should be the shift to an intensification of state-led violence to provide the state with mechanisms for the provision of its existence under constant military threat.
Associate Professor for History, the Faculty of Sociology and Law, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute (Ukraine)
E-mail: scholij@ukr.net
Paper abstract
Militarism and nation-building in the world of the 21st century: the military defeat of Ukraine in 2014 and perspectives for the war in 2022
This paper critically discusses the idea of a direct correlation between military defeat and stimulation of nation-building within the European context in the example of Ukraine. Contrary to the majority of examples of military defeats that form a basis for the national myths and paradigms (as it was also in Ukraine during both World Wars), the contemporary case of Ukraine demonstrates multiple dichotomies of this correlation.
On the one hand, Ukraine is de facto in a state of war with the Russian Federation starting from February 2014. After the period of major hostilities in 2014, the frontline came to a stalemate by February 2015. The frozen conflict in Ukraine was a major defeat for Kyiv, with three regions fully or partially occupied by Russia or Russia-controlled separatists. By the classical model, military defeat was used for the development of the Ukrainian state propaganda agenda, reflected in media and mass culture. National and military mobilizations, the major component of war-thorn life and foreign military pressure, should have been the obvious components of the everyday life of Ukraine after 2014.
Surprisingly, the reality of 2015-2022 was different. It was contrary to the state-led agenda of further national mobilization and adopting additional measures to return the occupied territories. As a diplomatic solution in Ukraine’s favor wasn’t possible only military action seemed to be a possibility to return the territorial integrity of the state. On the contrary, the majority of Ukraine’s population wasn’t ready for personal sacrifice, major economic loss, or long-time conflict. The slogan ‘to stop the war’ was one of the main reasons for the victory of the Zelensky administration in both elections of 2019. The majority of the population of Ukraine resisted compulsory mobilization to the army in 2014-2015, the same as it resisted regular military draft during 1991-2021. Draft dogging became one of the elements of liberalization in the Late Soviet Union and continued to evolve during the period of Ukrainian independence. General disarmament, the reduction of the quantity of every year draft, and corruption were the factors that turned the evasion of military duty into a regular and widespread social practice. Notwithstanding that, the same high level of political capital that the idea to abolish the draft brought to its initiators, mandatory military service is still in use in Ukraine. After the military defeat of 2014 and the loss of large territories in the East and South, the majority of the population of Ukraine still lived within the ‘welfare’ concept, devoting themselves to the Western values of mass consumption and self-realization. Nationalism, militarism, and patriotism might be nice slogans in Ukraine now, but not the reality of 2014-2022.
This thesis is reinforced by the analysis of several indicators of political and social activity during 2016-2021. It was made as a component of social surveys among the Ukrainian youth, conducted during 2017-2020 as a component of the scientific project “The improvement of the methods of human capital development as a component of the formation of the mobilization potential of Ukraine” (#2043, Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute). Its main outcome is that the majority of Ukrainian student youth, questioned after the 2014-2015 escalation, confirmed their major interest in personal development, but not possible future war. This indicator correlates with the idea of general discontent with military service and its compulsory obligation notwithstanding the state-led nationalism and propaganda. Many examples of mobilization evasion and cases of attempted flight to the EU after February 2022 reinforce this thesis.
In the final part of my speech, I discuss the perspectives on the development of contemporary militarism/patriotism including the outcomes of the active phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022. The dichotomy is rather strong and seems to be unsolvable. The global tendency to abolish compulsory military service is an overwhelming tendency that is an integral component of the common lifestyle worldwide. On the other hand, the realities of the geopolitical situation, and the case study of Ukraine reinforce the concept of compulsory military service. As the sources of possible global or regional instability (Russia, China, Iran, North Korea etc.) most definitely use their available population resources en masse, countries at risk have no choice but to reconsider their agendas of usage of the available population. There should be the shift to an intensification of state-led violence to provide the state with mechanisms for the provision of its existence under constant military threat.